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Commentary

Conflicts in Regulating Religious Institutions
By Alan C. Weinstein

Over the past 25 years, religious institutions have greatly
increased their claims of violation of religious freedom when
they are denied zoning approval or subjected to historic
preservation regulations. While no one can definitively explain the causes of this increase in First Amendment challenges, it can partially be traced to recent changes in both our
society and the way our political/legal system conceptualizes religious freedom.
Society has changed in a number of ways that create a
greater potential for conflict. In the past, religious institutions in most American communities were the Catholic Church
or "mainstream" Protestant denominations, such as Baptists, Lutherans, or Presbyterians.' In contrast, today's fastest-growing religious groups (Mormons, Evangelical Christians, Orthodox Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, and
Hasidic or other Ultra-Orthodox Jews) were, until recently,
either geographically isolated (Mormons in Utah and Hasidic
Jews in New York City) or a minuscule presence in the U.S.
until their numbers were swelled by immigrants (Sikhs,
Hindus, Muslims, and Buddhists).
With this growth and dispersion of these "non-mainstream" religious groups, it is increasingly common to find
one or more such groups in, or seeking to be in, any American
community. This leads to land-use conflicts. The authors of a
recently published study2 of all reported cases in the zoning
and land-use context claim that their findings "strongly
suggest that a high percentage of cases are being contested
by religious groups comprising a very small percentage of
the total population." Id. at 740.
These conflicts occur in a variety of circumstances although
only a small portion of the population is involved. On the one
hand, the arrival of a new religious denomination-if it is
small and poor-can lead to conflict if the members of the
fledgling congregation seek to worship and study regularly in
a private home or a rented storefront and the neighbors or
local officials claim the property is not zoned for use as a
house of worship. On the other hand, when a well-funded
religious denomination arrives and seeks approval for a new,
large house of worship-a Mormon temple or Evangelical
Christian "big box church" being paradigmatic cases-neighbors or local officials may again object, citing such traditional

Alan Weinstein is a reporter for Land Use Law & Zoning Digest and an
Associate Professor and Director of the Law and Public Policy Program,
Cleveland State University/Cleveland Marshall School of Law.
1. Of course, larger cities, particularly those in the East and industrial
Midwest, also were home to various Eastern Orthodox, African American, and Jewish houses of worship, and many Americans had some
contact with one or more "non-mainstream" Protestant denominations,
such as Jehovah's Witnesses or Seventh-Day Adventists.
2. "Appendix A, Discrimination Against Minority Churches in Zoning Cases," in V. Keetch and M. Richards, The Need for Legislation to
EnshrineFree Exercise in the Land Use Context, 32 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 725,
736(1999).

zoning concerns as effect on property values, traffic, parking,
landscaping, etc. as the basis for their opposition. Regrettably,
conflict may also result from citizens' and local officials'
antipathy toward, and resulting discriminatory actions against,
the newly arrived denomination.'
Other factors add to this "new arrival" problem. The
traditional location for houses of worship are residential
neighborhoods. But here any proposed new nonresidential
use is likely to be opposed by neighbors: the classic NIMBY
phenomenon. In the case of newly arrived religious organizations, however, the NIMBY issue may be particularly difficult to overcome because of recent changes in the manner in
which Americans worship. Previous generations attended
houses of worship in their own neighborhoods, but today
"religious institutions serve populations that are less and
less centered in the geographic communities in which they
are located." M. Stern, Zoningfor Churches: Guidelines, But No
Magic Formula, 7 Responsive Community No. 3 at 69, 70
(1997). Thus, the proposed house of worship is likely to be
seen by its neighbors as providing few benefits-since most
of them will not be members-while imposing on them the
burdens associated with any more intense land-use, such as
increased traffic, noise, parking difficulties, and the possibility of negative effects on property values.
Another factor that may be exacerbating land-use conflicts
involving religious institutions is the escalating debate over
the role of religion in American society. More conservative
religious groups-perhaps best exemplified by those associated with the Christian Coalition in its heyday under Ralph
Reed-have long advocated a larger role for religion in American
society. When the U.S. Supreme Court in 1990 handed down a
decision' that was seen by a broad spectrum of religious
conservatives as contracting religious freedom, these groups
responded by mounting a lobbying campaign asking Congress to "overturn" that decision. Their efforts resulted in the
passage of the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000 bb-200bb-4 (1994) (RFRA), in 1993; however, RFRA was subsequently declared unconstitutional by
3. Professor Laycock notes that there is suspicion of, or hostility to,
religious intensity. "People who are religious themselves are often
hostile to unfamiliar faiths, to high intensity faiths, and to the conservative and evangelical churches associated with the 'Religious Right."'
Thus in 1993, 45 percent of Americans admitted to "mostly unfavorable" or "very unfavorable" opinions of "religious fundamentalists,"
and 86 percent admitted to mostly or very unfavorable opinions of
"members of religious cults or sects." In 1989, 30 percent of Americans
said they would not like to have "religious fundamentalists" as neighbors, and 62 percent said they would not like to have "members of
minority religious sects or cults" as neighbors. A desire not to have
members of a minority sect as neighbors is closely related to a desire not
to have the minority sect's church as a neighbor." See, e.g., D. Laycock,
State RFRAs and Land Use Litigation,32 U.C. DAvis L. REV.755,760 (1999)
(footnotes omitted).
4. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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the U.S. Supreme Court in 1997. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997), 49 ZD 285. That decision has not put the
matter to rest: The religious groups that advocated for the
passage of RFRA are now lobbying both Congress and state
legislatures for new legislation to exempt religious activities
from regulations-including zoning and landmark preservation-that, in their view, are overly restrictive.
This article seeks to clarify where the law stands today as a
context for the land-use regulation of religious institutions. It
first describes how the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the
religious freedom guarantees in the federal Constitution and
how RFRA sought to alter that interpretation. In addition, how
federal and state courts have interpreted religious freedom is
explained in this article in the context of religious institutions'
legal challenges to local land-use regulations. The article concludes with an analysis of where the law stands today on major
issues in the land-use regulation of religious institutions.
FIRST AMENDMENT'S RELIGION CLAUSES
The First Amendment states in relevant part: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ." Thus, the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of religion addresses
two distinct aspects of that freedom. First, the federal
government may not take action that would effect an
"establishment of religion." This is known as the Establishment Clause. Second, the federal government must
not prohibit the "free exercise" of religion. This is known
as the Free Exercise Clause. As with other guarantees of
personal rights, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the
religion clauses are also applicable to state and local government through their incorporation into the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5
Establishment Clause
The Supreme Court analyzes challenges to governmental
regulation that arise under the Establishment Clause under a
tripartite test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971). Under Lemon, a challenged government action must:
(1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not foster
excessive government entanglement with religion. While
the first two prongs of the Lemon test are utilized to evaluate
challenged governmental actions that support religion, the
third prong, addressing the public entanglement with religion, has been invoked to limit government regulatory programs that arguably impair religion. In recent years, although some Justices have expressed dissatisfaction with
Lemon and utilized other tests for Establishment Clause claims,6
the Court has declined to overrule Lemon.

5. The "due process clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. Const., amend. 14, § 1. Since 1897, the
U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that various of the first 10 amendments to
the Constitution, the "Bill of Rights," have been "incorporated" into the
due process clause. The cases holding that the religion clauses are
incorporated into the due process clause are: Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause) and Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause).
6. See, e.g., Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" test analysis in Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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Establishment Clause in Land-Use Context
The Establishment Clause has been central to a number of
high-profile legal and political debates over religion's role in
society. These debates have focused on: How much religious
expression is permissible in public schools? May publicly
funded "school choice" vouchers be used for tuition at religious schools? Although the Establishment Clause has been
less prominent in challenges to land-use regulations, it may
be raised as a legal claim when a local government exempts
religious institutions, but not other land uses, from a particular regulation. Such exemptions have most commonly involved historic preservation ordinances, but have occasionally been applied in other contexts.
The conflicting outcomes in two cases involving exemptions for schools and church-operated day care centers
show the unpredictability of Establishment Clause litigation. In Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 8 F.3d 484 (7th Cir.
1993), 46 ZD 108, cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1236 (1994), the
Seventh Circuit ruled that a zoning ordinance requiring
day care centers to obtain a special permit to operate in
residential districts, but exempting church-run "nursery
schools" from this requirement, was rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose of minimizing governmental interference with religious affairs and, thus, did
not violate either the Equal Protection or Establishment
clauses. More recently, however, in Renzi v. Connelly School
of the Holy Child, 61 F.Supp.2d 440 (D.Md. 1999), a federal
trial court found an Establishment Clause violation in a
Montgomery County, Maryland, zoning ordinance exempting from a special permit requirement "any private
educational institution, or parochial school, which is located in a building or on premises owned or leased by any
church or religious organization, the government of the
United States, the State of Maryland or any agency thereof,
Montgomery County or any incorporated village or town
within Montgomery County." Id. at 442.
The Renzi court distinguished Cohen on the ground that,
while regulating church-based day care "posed a significant
risk of entangling the government in religious affairs, here,
defendants do not contend that there is any danger that
Montgomery County will become entangled in regulating
the activity of religious education. Requiring the School to
obtain a special exception would merely subject its use of the
property to such basic zoning considerations as constructing
facilities generally harmonious with the neighborhood and
preventing excessive traffic congestion." Id. at 446. The court
further stated that while the ordinance did not limit its
exemption to religious schools, the vast majority of the beneficiaries of the exemption would be religious schools, and
this would be an unlawful advancement of religion. Interestingly, this argument is quite similar to the reasoning employed in a recent well-publicized Ohio federal district court
decision, Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F.Supp.2d 834 (N.D.
Ohio 1999), striking down the Ohio school voucher program
on the ground that "while both public and private schools
are eligible, only private schools have chosen to participate
in the Program, and the vast majority of them are parochial."
Id. at 847
Exempting religious institutions from otherwise applicable historic preservation laws is also currently at issue
in a case that was granted review by the California Supreme Court last May, East Bay Asian Local Development
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Corp. v. State of California, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 908 (Cal. App.),
51 ZD 102, review granted and opinion superseded, 85
Cal.Rptr.2d 695, 977 P.2d 692 (1999). Here, a group of local
governments and organizations concerned with historic
preservation challenged the constitutionality of a 1994
amendment to the Government Code that effectively exempted noncommercial property owned by religious organizations from landmark designation. After a lengthy
discussion of Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause
cases, the Appeals Court upheld the amendment on the
ground that "the state must have room to maneuver"
between the "intrusion prohibited by the free exercise
clause and [the] assistance prohibited by the establishment clause," and thus could constitutionally act to prevent local government historic preservation ordinances
from impinging on the free exercise rights of religious
organizations. 81 Cal.Rptr.2d at 915. Because this opinion
has been accepted for review by the California Supreme
Court, however, it has no legal effect pending that court's
ruling.
Free Exercise Clause
Normally, First Amendment challenges to government regulation do not involve claims that government has impermissibly singled out religious activity for regulatory treatment,
but rather, that an individual or religious institution should
be exempted from an otherwise valid, neutral regulation of
general applicability. The U.S. Supreme Court's first decision on the Free Exercise Clause, Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1878), affirming the bigamy conviction of a Mormon, essentially denied the concept that a general governmental regulatory scheme could ever violate the Free Exercise Clause by crafting a dichotomy between religious belief
and religious practice. The Court said that while laws "cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they
may with practices." Id. at 166. For the next 90 years, the
Court declined to sustain a claim that a general regulatory
scheme violated the Free Exercise Clause.
The modern era of Free Exercise Clause interpretation can
be traced to the Court's 1963 decision in Sherbert v. Werner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963), upholding a free exercise challenge to an
unemployment compensation law that effectively penalized
the plaintiff's refusal to work on her Sabbath. The Sherbert
decision interpreted the Free Exercise Clause as requiring an
exemption from a government regulation that significantly
burdens religious practice unless the regulation could be
justified by a compelling governmental interest and was the
least restrictive means of achieving that interest. The Court
reaffirmed Sherbert's principles nine years later in Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), holding that Wisconsin's law
criminalizing the failure to obey the state's mandatory school
attendance requirement could not be enforced against Amish
families who refused to send their children to school beyond
the eighth grade. But Yoder proved to be the high watermark
for free exercise exemptions: Following Yoder, the Court
rejected every free exercise challenge to a general governmental regulation, except for those claims based on a denial
of unemployment compensation benefits that were governed directly by Sherbert. Despite the Court's failure to
uphold claims for exemption outside the unemployment
context after Yoder, Sherbert's principles were not dead. They
were applied by state and lower federal courts, and state and

local governments would often craft religious exemptions to
conform to their perception of what Sherbert required.
Reinterpretation of Free Exercise in Smith
The Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990), dramatically revised its interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause. In Smith, a sharply divided Court7 denied
the free exercise claim of two Oregon state employees who
had been denied unemployment benefits after they were
fired as drug and alcohol counselors because the state viewed
their religiously motivated peyote smoking as work-related
misconduct. In denying their claim, the Court abandoned
Sherbert's "compelling interest" test, holding that "the right
of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'"
Stated another way, "an individual's religious beliefs [do
not] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid
law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate." Id.
at 879. In the Court's view, striking a balance between protection of religious practices and the requirements imposed
by neutral laws of general application was a task for legislatures, not courts.
Three years later, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah,508 U.S. 520 (1993), the Court made clear that
Smith did not apply to laws that are "non-neutral" because
their object is to infringe upon or restrict practices based on
their religious motivation. In Babalu Aye, which dealt with a
group of ordinances that restricted the practice of ritual
animal sacrifice by the Santeria religion-an amalgam of
traditional African beliefs and Roman Catholicism-the Court
ruled unanimously that a law targeting religion may be
upheld only if justified by a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to advance that interest.' The
significance of the Babalu Aye decision lay in the willingness
of the Court to discount the self-serving arguments of municipal officials regarding the "neutrality" of the anti-Santerian
ordinances. The case thus sent a strong signal to the lower
courts that the Smith decision, which had been widely criticized on the ground that it would lead to an erosion of
religious liberty for "non-mainstream" religions, should not

be read to permit the targeting of religious practices under
the guise of a purportedly general and religiously neutral
ordinance.
7. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by
Justices Rehnquist, White, Stevens, and Kennedy. Justice O'Connor
concurred in the judgment, but wrote a separate opinion, which
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in part; Justice
Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justices Brennan and
Marshall joined.
8. The ordinances totally barred ritual animal sacrifice and prohibited
the "slaughter" of animals outside of areas zoned for slaughterhouses,
but provided an exemption for kosher slaughter. The Court, finding the
record replete with evidence of hostility towards the Santerian's practice of ritual slaughter, concluded that suppression of such sacrifices
was the object of the ordinances, thus requiring that they be justified by
a compelling governmental interest. The Court then found that the
city's asserted interests in protecting the public health and preventing
cruelty to animals could be addressed by restrictions short of a total ban
on ritual slaughter. 508 U.S. 520, 537-38.
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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
The hostility of a broad spectrum of religious and political
groups to the Smith case, which was not abated in the least by
the Babalu Aye decision, led to a concerted effort aimed at
Congressional action to "restore" the religious protections
that Smith had removed. The effort was astonishingly successful: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was
passed unanimously in the House of Representatives and
drew only three negative votes in the Senate. President
Clinton described the act's signing ceremony as having "a
majestic quality" because of the central role that religion
played in American life. Substantively, RFRA stated that
Smith "virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws
neutral toward religion," 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb (a) (1994), and
sought to restore that requirement by legislatively mandating that government shall not substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, "unless (1) it is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 bb (a)&(b) (1994).
Although RFRA resulted in hundreds of lawsuits before it
was struck down in 1997, less than a dozen RFRA cases
involved claims based on land-use regulations.' Further, a
number of cases challenging such regulations during this
period ignored RFRA, and relied solely on claims that the
governmental action violated federal and/or state constitutional guarantees of religious freedom."o In all, only a handful of cases successfully challenged landmark or land-use
regulations under RFRA, one of them being the decision in
Floresv. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996), 49 ZD 145,
that was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court.
The lower court decisions involving RFRA challenges to
land-use regulations yielded mixed results. For example,
several courts found that RFRA barred enforcement of zoning restrictions on religious institutions that sought to establish homeless shelters or food programs in residential areas." However, in Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of
Daytona Beach, 885 F.Supp. 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1995), 48 ZD 2, a
Florida federal district court rejected a claim that RFRA
barred the application of location restrictions to a homeless
shelter and food bank proposed to be housed in a church.
The court found that "the City's interest in regulating homeless shelters and food banks is a compelling interest and that
[the zoning] code furthers that interest in the least restrictive
means," thus upholding the city under the First Amendment
9. Most RFRA cases were filed by prison inmates who claimed that
various prison rules violated their religious freedoms. The overwhelming majority of these claims were found to be without merit.
10. Depending on the case, these failures to raise a RFRA claim could
be explained by anything from good legal strategy (e.g., there were
favorable precedents under the state constitution, or concerns about
RFRA's constitutionality or the plaintiff had a weak case and did not
want to set a "bad" precedent on a RFRA claim) to malpractice ("What's
RFRA?").
11. See Stuart Circle Parish v. Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of
Richmond, 946 F.Supp. 1225 (E.D. Va. 1996); Western Presbyterian
Church v. District of Columbia, 862 F.Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994), 47 ZD 82;
Jesus Center v. Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 544 N.W.2d
698 (Mich. App. 1996), 48 ZD 229.
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analysis that predated Smith. Id. at 1560.
In other land-use cases decided under RFRA, courts: denied a claim that RFRA barred the application of parking
requirements to religious institutions; 12 held that RFRA does
not apply to uses that constitute a nuisance, in this instance a
massive display of Christmas lights that created traffic jams
and other problems in a residential neighborhood;1 3 denied a
preliminary injunction to plaintiffs claiming that RFRA barred
the need for a special permit for a Wiccan Church in a
residential district; 4 and declared RFRA to be an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers. See Keeler v. Cumberland,
928 F.Supp. 591 (D.Md. 1996).
As can be seen from this brief description of cases decided
under RFRA, the act had relatively little impact on land-use
regulation of religious institutions in its three and a half
years of existence. RFRA's legislative sponsors claimed that
the act was needed, in part, to blunt the harmful effects of
land-use regulations," but the validity of this claim is certainly called into question by the fact that there were only a
handful of RFRA challenges to land-use regulations. Moreover, RFRA challenges were generally unsuccessful, aside
from the three cases in which courts ruled that RFRA required an exemption from zoning laws that would otherwise
prohibit a religious institution from operating a food or
shelter program for the homeless. See note 11, supra. And
even in this category of cases, Daytona Rescue Mission rejected a RFRA challenge and Jesus Center came under sharp
criticism. See, Mary J. Dwyer, Note, Oops! You Missed a Step:
The Court Stumbles on the Substantial-BurdenThreshold in Jesus
Center v. FarmingtonHills Zoning Board of Appeals, 14 Cooley
L. Rev. 121 (1997).
The Demise of RFRA
The dispute in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997),
arose the same year RFRA was enacted. The city, a booming
suburb of San Antonio, Texas, denied St. Peter's Catholic
Church a building permit for a proposed addition because
the church was located partially in a historic district. The
church, built in the mission style in 1923, had begun planning in 1990 for the addition, needed to accommodate its
rapidly growing congregation. At about the same time, the
city council authorized the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a historic preservation plan for the city.
Under that plan, the church facade, but not the rest of the
structure, fell within the historic district, leading to the denial of the church's request for a permit that would involve
demolition of the facade. The Archbishop of San Antonio,
P.F. Flores, then sued the city in federal district court, arguing that the permit denial violated RFRA. The district court
denied the claim, holding that RFRA was unconstitutional

12. Germantown Seventh-Day Adventist Church v. Philadelphia,
1994 WL 470191 (E.D. Pa.).
13. Osborne v. Power, 890 S.W.2d 570 (Ark. 1994) (citing dictum in
Western Presbyterian).
14. Church of Iron Oak v. Palm Bay, 868 F.Supp. 1361 (M.D. Fla.
1994).
15. This claim they reiterate today before both the U.S. Congress and
state legislatures. See, e.g. Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use
Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 755 (1999).
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because it usurped the power of the judiciary "to say what
the law is." 877 F.Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995). The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, upholding RFRA,1 6 and
the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
In City of Boerne, the Court ruled 6-3 that RFRA was
unconstitutional. Although the case yielded five separate
opinions, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion found that the
statute was unconstitutional because it exceeded the powers
that Congress had been granted under the enforcement clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Justice Stevens, in a separate concurring opinion, argued that RFRA also violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it
granted a governmental preference for religion, noting explicitly that had the historic structure been "a museum or art
gallery" rather than a church, it would not be eligible for an
exemption from the city's landmark ordinance.
Developments Since Boerne
The Court's rejection of RFRA in Boerne was not the last word
on either the immediate dispute or the larger issues in the
case. After the case was remanded back to the trial court for a
decision based on Smith,'" the church and the city council
agreed to a settlement that would add a 750-seat auditorium
to the back of the existing church while retaining almost 80
percent of the original structure. The city's Historical Landmark Commission remained opposed to the demolition of
any portion of the landmarked church, however, and, in
September 1997, refused to take action on the church's request for a demolition permit. The next day, the trial judge
dismissed the lawsuit, refusing to give the parties any more
time to finalize the settlement agreement. The matter was
finally concluded the following month when the city council
authorized the church to proceed with the demolition. Construction of the new facility was finished in early 1999.
The larger issues in this case will not be resolved so easily
or expeditiously. Following the Supreme Court's ruling,

16. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
RFRA does not violate the separation of powers and that the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to
legislate acts such as RFRA to scrutinize statutes which burden an
individual's free exercise of religion).
17. Justice Kennedy's opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg, with Justice
Scalia joining in all but a minor portion, focused on whether RFRA was
a proper exercise of the enforcement power granted to the Congress
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment-"The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provision of this
article"-since "Congress relied on its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power in enacting the most far reaching and substantial of
RFRA's provisions, those which impose its requirements on the states."
521 U.S. 507, 517. Kennedy argued that because the act was so farreaching-applying "at every level of government, displacing laws and
prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless
of subject matter," Id. at 532, and imposed strict scrutiny-"the most
demanding test known to constitutional law"-Id. at 534, if a claimant
under the act could demonstrate a substantial burden, the act "is so out
of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot
be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in
constitutional protections." Id. at 532. Thus, Kennedy concluded, RFRA
contradicted vital principles necessary to maintain the separation of
powers and was unconstitutional.
18. Flores v. City of Boerne, 119 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1997).

various religious and political groups brought several different "religious freedom" proposals to Congress. What has
emerged is the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R.
1691, approved by the House in July 1999. That act, in brief, is
another attempt to restore the "compelling interest" standard for general laws that are determined to burden the free
exercise of religion. State legislatures have also been the
target of campaigns to enact "religious freedom" legislation,
a number of which have been successful,19 with legislation
awaiting action in Colorado, Missouri, and Oregon. There
have also been some defeats, however, with legislation vetoed in New Mexico and sponsors withdrawing their bills in
California and Maryland.
Given the limited impact of RFRA on the outcome of
challenges to land-use regulations, it is certainly questionable whether this new state legislation will have any significant effect. In the first reported case involving a "state RFRA,"
City of Chicago Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel
Church and Ministries, Inc., 707 N.E.2d 53,51 ZD 160 (Ill App.

1999), appealallowed, 184 Ill. 2d 554,714 N.E.2d 525 (1999), an
Illinois appellate court upheld the city's requirement that
prohibited any religious group from establishing a house of
worship in a B-2 commercial zone until it obtained a special
use permit. This decision is noteworthy, both because the

case was decided under the pre-Smith compelling interest
test, as required by the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Ill. Pub. Act 98-806 (December 2,1998), and because
the Illinois Supreme Court agreed in June 1999 to hear an
appeal of the decision.
WHERE ARE WE NOW?
Zoning Houses of Worship
There are three basic approaches to cases involving challenges to zoning regulations that would have the effect of
prohibiting a house of worship at a particular location. A
minority of state courts, exemplified by California, apply a
due process analysis to the zoning of a house of worship and
treat such uses no differently than any other land use and
thus presume that the prohibition is justified unless the
religious institution can prove that it is not. In the majority of
states, with New York being the leading example, courts
apply a due process analysis that places houses of worship in
a preferred category so that it is the local government that
bears the burden of justifying its prohibition. The federal
courts, in contrast, apply a First Amendment balancing test
to judge the constitutionality of a zoning prohibition. Each of
these approaches is explained in greater detail below.
State Courts
State courts historically approached zoning restrictions on
houses of worship under a substantive due process, rather
than First Amendment, analysis, the traditional "majority"
position being that the exclusion of houses of worship from
residential neighborhoods is a violation of substantive due
process. See, e.g., Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of North
Shore, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor,342 N.E.2d
19. As of late 1999, the following states had enacted a "religious
freedom" statute: Alabama (constitutional amendment approved by
public referendum), Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas; the last, however, containing an exemption for land-use regulation.
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534 (N.Y. 1975), 28 ZD 361, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976).
The traditional "minority" position held that such exclusion
is a valid exercise of the police power so long as houses of
worship are not totally excluded from a community. See, e.g.,
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. City of Porterville, 203 P.2d 823, 1 ZD 39
(Cal. App. 1949), appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949).
In recent years, however, there have been two discernible
trends in the state courts. First, there has been some erosion
of the traditional "majority" position. For example, in City of
Colorado Springs v. Blanche, 761 P.2d 212 (Colo. 1988), the
Colorado Supreme Court overruled City of Englewood v.
Apostolic Christian Church, 362 P.2d 172 (Colo. 1961), 41 ZD
169, which held that an ordinance requiring a conditional
use permit for churches to locate in single- and two-family
districts was unconstitutional as a blanket exclusion of churches
from those districts. In Colorado Springs, the court stated that
it was joining "the majority of jurisdictions" that make the
right of a church to locate in a particular district permissive
rather than absolute. 761 P.2d at 216-17. Even in New York,
the leading "majority" jurisdiction, the preferred position of
religious institutions has become less clear in recent years.
See Cornell University v. Bagnardi, 503 N.E.2d 509, 514 (N.Y.
1986), 39 ZD 193 (stating "[tihere is simply no conclusive
presumption that any religious or educational use automatically outweighs its ill effects").
Second, there has been a movement in some state courts
towards applying an analysis based on the First Amendment, rather than substantive due process, in cases involving
regulation, rather than outright prohibition, of religious institutions. For example, in Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple
v. Sullivan, 953 P.2d 1315 (Haw. 1998), 51 ZD 8, the Hawaii
Supreme Court upheld a height limitation applied to the
plaintiff's house of worship after finding that the regulation
did not substantially burden the free exercise rights of the
worshipers. Several other courts have also found that various zoning regulations did not impermissibly infringe upon
the free exercise of religion. 20
Federal Courts
Prior to 1983, no federal Court of Appeals had considered
a case involving the zoning of religious institutions. In
that year, both the Sixth Circuit, in Lakewood, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d
303 (6th Cir. 1983) and the Eleventh Circuit, in Grosz v.
City ofMiami Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), 36 ZD 88,
upheld zoning regulations against First Amendment challenges, using different variations of a balancing test that
weighed the competing interests of municipal regulation
and freedom of religion.
In Lakewood, where the zoning code restricted new houses
of worship to an area comprising approximately 10 percent
20. See, e.g: Grace Community Church v. Town of Bethel, 622 A.2d
591 (Conn. App. 1993), 45 ZD 343 (applying First Amendment analysis in upholding special permit requirement for churches); Bethel
Lutheran Church v. Village of Morton, 559 N.E.2d 533 (Ill.App. 1990)
(using First Amendment analysis to uphold the imposition of an
enrollment cap on a parochial school); and Macedonian Orthodox
Church v. Planning Board of the Township of Randolph, 636 A.2d 96
(N.J. Super. 1994), 46 ZD 327 (finding no First Amendment issue in
ordinance requiring a special use permit before a church could
construct an accessory building).
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of the city, the Sixth Circuit used a two-step inquiry, first
evaluating the nature of the religious observance at stake
and then the nature of the burden that the municipality
sought to place on the religious observance. The court found
the only burden on religious observance posed by the ordinance was financial: The congregation could worship as it
pleased, but was restricted in locating its proposed sanctuary. The court distinguished this minor burden from an
ordinance that forced the congregation to forego religious
observance through financial or criminal penalties or by
placing burdensome taxes on the exercise of religious beliefs.
Since the court found no restriction of First Amendment
rights, it determined that the municipality was free to regulate the location of churches in a reasonable manner to
maintain the residential character of certain neighborhoods.
In Grosz, an elderly Orthodox Jewish rabbi converted his
garage into a sanctuary for religious worship and as many as
50 congregants would attend religious services on occasion.
Religious uses were not permitted in this zone, but were
allowed in at least 50 percent of the residential zones, including an area four blocks from the rabbi's home. The Eleventh
Circuit employed a slightly different analysis than had the
Sixth in Lakewood, considering two threshold tests before
balancing the competing interests of the municipality and
the First Amendment. First, the court asked whether the
government sought to regulate religious beliefs or opinions
rather than merely placing a burden on religious conduct.
While the government may never regulate religious beliefs,
the First Amendment does not absolutely prohibit government regulation that burdens religious practices. Second, the
ordinance must have both a secular purpose and effect. Only
if a government regulation passes both of these threshold
tests should a court balance the burden on the city's legitimate interests in maintaining its zoning objectives against
the burden on the plaintiff's right to free exercise of religion.
Given the facts in this case, the court found that the ordinance passed both threshold tests and that the city's substantial interests in maintaining certain wholly residential zones
free of the noise and crowds associated with religious worship did not unduly burden freedom of religion since more
than half the city was available for religious institutions.
Since 1983, the majority of federal courts that have considered religious challenges to zoning ordinances have upheld
those ordinances, with most applying the Grosz analysis.2 1
But in Islamic CenterofMississippi, Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840
F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1988), 40 ZD 201, the Fifth Circuit found
that an ordinance, applied to deny a special permit for
establishment of a mosque at numerous proposed sites,
placed more than an incidental burden on the free exercise of
religion because it had the effect of forcing a group of rela-

21. See, e.g., Mount Elliott Cemetery Ass'n v. City of Troy, 171 F.3d
403 (6th Cir. 1999), 51 ZD 223 (holding that a city's denial of a rezoning
request for property planned for a Catholic cemetery did not violate the
landowner's right to free exercise of religion because zoning ordinance
was a neutral law of general applicability and the request was denied
because of various factors-e.g. insufficient buffer areas, traffic congestion, etc.-related to the use of the property); and Christ College, Inc. v.
Board of Supervisors, 944 F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1094 (1992) (holding that zoning regulation, which prohibited the
church from building a parochial school in a residential zone without a
special exception, was not a significant burden on the church's religious rights).

Commentary
tively poor university students to establish their mosque at
sites that were reasonably accessible only by automobile.'
Subsequently, in Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Jefferson County, 741 F.Supp. 1522 (N.D. Ala. 1990),23 42 ZD
279, a federal district court relied on both Grosz and Islamic
Center to strike down the county's procedure for obtaining a
rezoning to allow development of land for churches, which
permitted decisions to be determined on the basis of the
neighborhood's willingness to accept a church. The court
termed this "a thin reed upon which to base the exercise of
religious freedom," and suggested that the answer was to set
aside areas zoned for churches as of right or to set solely
objective standards for rezonings. Id. at 1534.
HISTORIC PRESERVATION OF
HOUSES OF WORSHIP
Several cases have considered either federal or state constitutional challenges to the application of historic preservation
ordinances to churches. While state supreme courts in Washington and Massachusetts have each invalidated the designation of one or more churches as a landmark, and a Maryland federal district court held that a landmark ordinance
was unconstitutional, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
has upheld such designations.
State Cases
In First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352
(Wash. 1990), 42 ZD 385, vacated and remanded, 499 U.S. 901
(1991), holding reinstated, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 840 P.2d 174
(1992), 45 ZD 235, the Washington Supreme Court found that
mere landmark designation of a church's exterior states a
constitutional violation under both the federal and state
constitutions. After its designation as a landmark in 1985, the
First Covenant Church sued the city of Seattle, seeking a
declaratory judgment that landmark designation of churches
was unconstitutional and that the enactment of an ordinance
specifically designating First Covenant Church a landmark
was void. The trial court held that the landmarks ordinance
was properly applied to churches and that until the city took
some action under the landmarks ordinance that burdened
the church-i.e., something beyond mere designation as a
landmark-the church's claim that the landmarks ordinance
violated its rights of religious freedom was premature.
787 P.2d at 1353-1354.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court
on both issues; however, that decision was rendered prior
to the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Smith.
Subsequently, after granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and remanded to the Washington Supreme Court for further consideration in light of
Smith. On remand, the Washington court distinguished
First Covenant from Smith on the ground that Seattle's
landmark ordinance was not a neutral law of general
application because it referred specifically to religion and

targeted specific structures for landmark designation. The
Washington Court then insulated its decision from further
federal court review by holding, as an independent ground
for its decision, that the ordinance was invalid under the
state constitution. 24 In subsequent decisions, the Washington Court held that mere designation of a church as a
landmark violated religious freedom because it might
pose a barrier should the church seek to sell the property-First United Methodist Church v. Hearing Examiner,
129 Wash.2d 238, 916 P.2d 374 (1996)-and that a demolition permit ordinance, which had potential to cause a 14month delay in plans to demolish a Catholic school building and construct a pastoral center, violated the free exercise
of religion guaranteed in the state constitution: Munns v.
Martin, 131 Wash.2d 192, 930 P.2d 318 (1997).
The Massachusetts case, Society ofJesus v. Boston Landmarks
Commission,409 Mass. 38,564 N.E.2d 571 (1990), is somewhat
unusual in that it involved designation of portions of the
church's interior as well as its exterior. The Jesuits sued,
claiming that the designation of the interior of the church as a
landmark violated provisions in both the federal and state
constitutions. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
ruled that the landmark designation violated the state constitution,25 arguing that "[t]he configuration of the church
interior is so freighted with religious meaning that it must be
considered part and parcel of the Jesuits' religious worship."
Id. at 573. The court also ruled that the government interest in
historic preservation, although worthwhile, was not sufficiently compelling to justify a restraint on the free exercise of
religion. Id. at 574.
Federal Courts
On the same day that the Supreme Court vacated the judgment in First Covenant and remanded that case to the Washington court, it declined to review St. Bartholomew's Church v.
City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 905 (1991), where the Second Circuit had relied on Smith
to uphold the New York Landmarks Law against free exercise and takings claims. In St. Bartholomew's, a landmarked
church sought approval to demolish its seven-story "community house" adjacent to the sanctuary and erect a 59-story
office tower in its place. When this first request was denied
as an inappropriate alteration, the church filed a second
application, scaling down its proposed tower to 47 stories.
When this application was also denied, the church filed a
third application under a "hardship exception," claiming
that the commission should issue a certificate of appropriateness for the 47-story tower because the community house
was inadequate and the church needed the revenues it would
obtain from the new building both to maintain its sanctuary
and expand its social welfare programs. After several lengthy
public hearings and open executive sessions, the commis24. Article 1, section 11 of the Washington Constitution provides that
"[albsolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious... worship
...

22. The court also found that the city did not treat all religious
institutions that applied for special exceptions alike and could advance
no rational basis other than neighborhood opposition to show why the
exception granted to all other religious centers was denied the Islamic
Center.
23. See also 721 F.Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ala. 1989).

shall be guaranteed to every individual."

25. Article Two of the Massachusetts Constitution provides, in part:
"[N]o subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained in his person,
liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most
agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious
profession or sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the public
peace, or obstruct others in their religious worship."
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sion denied the application because the church had failed to
prove the necessary hardship.
The church then challenged the Landmarks Law, claiming
that it violated both the Establishment and Free Exercise
clauses of the First Amendment by excessively burdening
the practice of religion and entangling the government in
religious affairs. The federal district court upheld the commission, grounding its ruling on the New York Court of
Appeals "charitable purpose" test.2 6 On appeal, the Second
Circuit affirmed, but declined to apply the "charitable purpose" test. Relying instead on a number of Supreme Court
Free Exercise cases-including Smith, which was decided
after the district court decision-the Court of Appeals found
that "the Landmarks Law is a valid, neutral law of general
applicability" and agreed with the district court that the
church failed to prove that it cannot continue its religious
practices in its existing facilities.2 1
In contrast to the Second Circuit's ruling in St. Bartholomew's,
in Keeler v. Cumberland, 940 F.Supp. 879 (D.Md. 1996), a
Maryland federal district court ruled that a local landmark
law was not a "neutral law of general applicability" under
Smith, due to its variance and hardship provisions. Applying
a compelling governmental interest test, the state court found
that a denial of a permit to demolish a landmarked monastery violated the federal and state constitutions. Keeler illustrates two related points. First, that the Smith analysis need
not prove fatal to all Free Exercise challenges because of the
potential for flexibility in the application of the Smith analysis, both in deciding whether the challenged regulation is a
"neutral law of general applicability" and, if it is not, whether
the governmental interest asserted is "compelling." Second,
that same potential for flexibility makes it difficult to predict
the outcomes of such cases.

provisions of their state constitutions. In this regard, the
Washington decisions have far broader implications in terms
of a possible divergence between federal and state jurisprudence on free exercise claims in historic preservation
cases than does the Massachusetts Court's decision in Society of jesus. First, the Massachusetts decision involved landmark designation of the church's interior and few ordinances authorize such designation, likely because landmark
commissions recognize that such designations raise significant First Amendment issues.28 Further, the "Free Exercise
Clause" of the Massachusetts constitution is stated in far

Contrast of Federal and State Courts
in Landmarking Cases
As noted above, on the same day the U.S. Supreme Court
vacated the judgment in First Covenant and remanded the
case to the Washington Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Smith, it declined to review the Second
Circuit's decision in St. Bartholomew's which had relied on
Smith. These actions signal that the Court, when it last
faced the issue, did not view landmark laws as suspect
under the federal constitution merely because they apply
to religious institutions. Thus, a religious institution will
not be excused from complying with landmark laws, on
federal constitutional grounds, unless it can prove that
meeting those requirements leaves it unable to carry out
its religious mission.
While this latest statement by the Supreme Court will
guide how challenges to landmark laws are decided under
the federal constitution, it does not bar state courts from
finding greater protection for religious institutions under

CONCLUSION
In the case of religious freedom challenges to land-use
regulation, the question may not so much be "Where Are
We?" as "Where Are You?" Similar religious freedom
claims may have very different outcomes depending on
the jurisdiction or court in which they are brought. In
contrast to the federal courts-where religious freedom
challenges have rarely been successful, absent blatant discrimination, including challenges brought under the "compelling interest" test during both the pre-Smith and RFRA
eras-the success of a religious freedom challenge in state
court has always depended in large part on whether that
state had adopted the "majority" (preferential treatment)
or "minority" (no preferential treatment) view of the substantive due process standard to be applied to such challenges. Further, the differing treatment of "religious freedom" challenges to land-use regulation in state courts is

26. Under that test, there is a violation where the landmark designation would prevent or seriously interfere with the carrying out of the
charitable purpose of the institution. See A. Weinstein, The Myth of
Ministry vs. Mortar: A Legal Policy Analysis of Landmark Designationof
Religious Institutions, 65 TEMPLE L. REv. 91, 116-123 (1992).
27. Id. at 354-356. In a footnote, the Second Circuit also agreed that the
district court had been correct to dismiss the church's claim that the
landmarks law violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 356, n. 4.
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broader terms

29

than the corresponding clause in the fed-

eral constitution and has a legislative history that emphasizes its role in guaranteeing freedom of choice as to manner of worship. See Society of Jesus, 564 N.E.2d at 572-573.
Thus, while it is true that many state constitutions guarantee freedom of religion in terms far broader than those in
the First Amendment, few, if any, feature the combination
of broadly protective terminology and legislative history
found in Massachusetts.3

1

The potential reach of the Washington decisions stems
from the fact that the Washington Supreme Court, prior to its
decision in First Covenant on remand, had applied the compelling interest test by relying on federal Free Exercise cases
and had never suggested that its state free exercise provision
had an existence independent of the First Amendment. See S.
Parsell, Note, Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion
Under State Constitutions:A Response to Employment Division
v. Smith, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 747, 759 (1993). Thus, by
recognizing the independence of the free exercise clause in
the state constitution, the Washington Court offers guidance
to any state seeking authority by which to retain the compelling state interest test.

28. See, A. Carmella, Houses of Worship and Religious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to LandmarkPreservationandArchitecturalReview, 36 VILL. L.
REV. 401 (1991) (critiquing the relationship between architecture and
theology).
29. See note 25, supra.
30. For example, the parallel provision of the Washington Constitution, Article 1, section 11, provides that "[albsolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious . . worship .. . shall be guaranteed to
every individual."

Commentary
now also being affected by the enactment of state RFRAs
and whether, like Texas, it is a state RFRA that exempts
land-use regulation from its effect.
We are clearly in the midst of a dynamic environmentsocially, politically, and legally-regarding the conflict
between religious institutions and land-use regulation.
Regrettably, elements on both sides at times have advocated extreme positions. Some religious groups claim that
their right to choose when and where they assemble for
worship is almost absolute and that government may
never lawfully landmark a property devoted to religious
use if the congregation objects. Some local officials and
citizens groups argue that "religious freedom" should

apply only to beliefs and practices, and thus decisions
about where a house of worship may locate or whether it
should be landmarked involve nothing more than property rights and so a church should be treated no differently than a discount store or movie theater.
There is surely room for accommodation between these
extremes. Religious worship should not be allowed to
occur wherever and whenever a congregation chooses
with scant regard for the negative effects imposed on
neighbors and the surrounding community. Likewise, a
request for permission to construct or occupy a site for
religious worship should not be equated with permission
to construct a commercial building.
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